Employment: Former Army employee’s discrimination suit is dismissed

Where a former employee failed to plead facts making her claims for disparate treatment, hostile work environment and retaliation plausible, her lawsuit was dismissed.

Background

Dorothy Seabrook sued the Secretary of the Army under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, alleging discrimination based on her race, color, sex and protected activities. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim of disparate treatment, hostile work environment or retaliation.

Disparate treatment

Seabrook does not allege facts to plausibly state a claim that the Army disciplined her because of her race, color or sex. The attachments to Seabrook’s amended complaint reveal she was disciplined because an investigation showed she created a toxic work environment and made inappropriate or belittling comments and inappropriate physical contact with staff. Although Seabrook disputes the investigative findings, she has alleged no factual basis to support the conclusion that discriminatory bias, rather than the outcome of the investigation, was the Army’s true motivation for disciplining her.

Seabrook asserts that discriminatory motivation is apparent from the “preferential treatment” shown to her subordinate Hamilton, a white man, who was “involved in misconduct and performance issues” but “was never investigated.” These allegations do not raise a plausible inference that the Army investigated Seabrook because of her race, color or sex.

Seabrook also alleges disparate punishment based on the severity of her discipline relative to two white employees she asserts the Army treated more leniently. Seabrook’s allegations about the two comparators she proposes—a white man named Chris Hamilton and a white woman named Kim—are insufficient to provide a meaningful point of comparison.

Hostile work environment

Harassment is “based on” race, color or sex when an employee would not have experienced the harassment “but for” her protected characteristic. Seabrook has failed to allege facts supporting but-for causation. Specifically, Seabrook asserts that, “[i]n the absence of” any other reason for the Army to halt Hamilton’s discipline, investigate and suspend her, and disclose her suspension, she “believe[s] it was race[, color or sex] that motivated” the alleged harassment. That does not suffice.

“Whether the environment is objectively hostile or abusive is judged from the perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position.’” Seabrook’s allegations fail to satisfy this element as well. None of the actions she identifies are objectively abusive, humiliating or physically threatening. They instead reflect a difference of opinion about how to discipline Hamilton and the steps taken to investigate Seabrook’s negative leadership and execute her own discipline.

Retaliation

Seabrook alleges that her investigation, suspension and poor performance evaluation were retaliation for participating as a witness in Wriglesworth’s EEO activity and for filing her own EEO complaints. According to Seabrook, however, the retaliatory individuals were not aware of her participation as a witness in Wriglesworth’s EEO proceeding until after they investigated Seabrook and issued the notice of proposed suspension. And Seabrook had not filed her own EEO complaints at that point. So the investigation and suspension could not have been retaliatory.

Regarding Seabrook’s poor performance review, Balocki issued her review (for the period July 2013 through June 2014) in February 2015. That was approximately five to six months after Balocki and others became aware of Seabrook’s participation as a witness in Wriglesworth’s EEO proceeding, which is too long to constitute a causal connection based on temporal proximity. As for a connection between Seabrook’s February performance review and her January EEO complaint, Seabrook does not allege facts to support an inference that Balocki was aware of her complaint when he issued her review.

Affirmed.

Concurring/dissenting opinion

Gregory, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part:

It is undisputed that Seabrook engaged in perhaps the most quintessential protected activity—filing a formal EEO complaint in January 2015—and in February 2015, she suffered an adverse action by way of receiving a poor review by Balocki. As such, Seabrook clearly has pled a plausible claim for retaliation that satisfies the pleading standard of 12(b)(6).

Likewise, Seabrook clearly has pled a plausible claim for disparate treatment based on the stark differences in how she and a white male employee were assessed during the performance evaluation process. Yet, the majority holds otherwise. Accordingly, I must dissent.

Seabrook v. Driscoll, Case No. 20-1961, Aug. 4, 2025. 4th Cir. (Rushing), from EDNC at Raleigh (Dever). Dennis L. Friedman for Appellant. Rudy E. Renfer for Appellee. VLW 025-2-304. 26 pp.