Immigration: Petitioner claims he will be tortured if returned to Guyana

Where the Board of Immigration Appeals failed to address a man’s argument that he will be tortured if returned to Guyana, because he’s a Black criminal deportee with physical disabilities, it erred.

Background

Marlon McDougall petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals that denied his claim for protection under the Convention Against Torture, or CAT. The Board concluded that McDougall wasn’t entitled to deferral of removal because he failed to show that Guyanese officials would specifically intend to torture him, or that the Guyanese government would acquiesce to his torture by others.

Analysis

To warrant protection under the CAT, an applicant must “establish that it is more likely than not that he or she would be tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal.” McDougall argues that the Board ignored unrebutted evidence that those who share certain traits of his—Black people, people with disabilities and criminal deportees—face an increased likelihood of torture in Guyana.

The court agrees. Though McDougall fears torture related to his mental illness (which the Board did address), he also fears torture for these other reasons. And he presented evidence and arguments in support of those reasons.

McDougall testified that he feared he would be targeted and tortured by police and by members of the public because he’s a deportee, has physical disabilities and is Black. He explained that he had learned his criminal history was “all over the news” in Guyana and that people were “waiting for him.” He submitted evidence of heinous acts of violence committed by the police and the public against individuals like him, and accounts of the government’s willingness to turn a blind eye to the latter.

Yet the Board (and the immigration judge) focused solely on the likelihood of torture on account of McDougall’s mental illness. Indeed, the Board’s decision doesn’t mention McDougall’s argument (and accompanying evidence) that he will be tortured because he’s a Black criminal deportee with physical disabilities. While the Board did address McDougall’s contention that his mental illnesses would lead to his torture, it was not free to ignore those other “important aspects of [McDougall’s] claim.”

The government, resisting this conclusion, points to two statements from the Board’s decision: its conclusions that the immigration judge (1) addressed “evidence of police violence in finding that [police] do not” “intentionally harm people with mental health issues on account of discrimination and social stigma” and (2) didn’t clearly err in “finding the government does not intend to torture its citizens.”

Despite the Government’s artful italicization, its reading of both statements is wrong. In context, the statements refer to torture related to mental illness. Neither shows that the Board considered risk-of-torture evidence that was unrelated to mental illness or offers a “specific, cogent reason[] for disregarding [that] credible, significant, and unrebutted evidence.” Nor does the rest of the Board’s opinion. By ignoring this evidence, the Board “disregard[ed] important aspects of [McDougall]’s claim” and abused its discretion.

Petition granted. Vacated and remanded.

McDougall v. Bondi, Case No. 23-1722, Sept. 5, 2025. 4th Cir. (Diaz), from Board of Immigration Appeals. Aimee Leah Mayer-Salins for Petitioner. Jaclyn Georgette Hagner for Respondent. VLW 025-2-362. 12 pp.