Criminal: Nazi collector convicted in federal hate crimes trial

Where a man charged with assaulting victims because of their race challenged the introduction of Nazi memorabilia at his trial, his challenge failed. He was on notice that there might be consequences if he presented a defense that placed his Nazi memorabilia at issue. Yet he chose to do so anyways by framing himself as a military collector.

Background

In Marian Hudak’s federal hate crimes trial, the central question was whether he assaulted his victims “because of” their race. The jury found that he did. On appeal, Hudak argues that the jury should have considered evidence of his mental illness and should not have considered evidence of his Nazi memorabilia.

Mental health

Hudak challenges the district court’s evidentiary ruling excluding evidence of his mental illness. This evidence primarily took the form of an expert report by Dawn Graney, a psychologist. Hudak also attempted to offer his own testimony on the subject.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Graney’s expert testimony under Rule 702. There was a striking incongruence between Graney’s expert disclosure, which surmised that mental illness was a cause of Hudak’s offense conduct, and her report, which included almost no facts about the period of time in which the conduct occurred. It was reasonable for the court to conclude that this analytical gap made Graney’s opinion unreliable.

The district court alternatively rested its decision to exclude Hudak’s mental health evidence on the Insanity Defense Reform Act, or IDRA, which provides that “[m]ental disease or defect does not . . . constitute a defense” to a federal crime unless the defendant pleads insanity. Since Hudak did not plead insanity, the court held, he could not present evidence that mental illness caused him to assault J.D. and J.S.—either in the form of Graney’s report or his own testimony.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding this evidence under the IDRA, either. The plain language of the statute “bars a defendant who is not pursuing an insanity defense from offering evidence of his lack of volitional control as an alternative defense.” While this court has suggested the IDRA permits an exception when mental health evidence is “presented to negate the specific intent element of a specific intent crime,” rather than to establish lack of volitional control generally, the exception applies only in “rare” cases, and this is not one of them.

Setting aside Rule 702 and the IDRA, Hudak’s attempt to introduce mental health evidence suffered from a more fundamental problem: his mental health was not particularly relevant to the factual question facing the jury. The jury was asked to decide whether Hudak assaulted his victims “because of” their race, color and national origin. That question is most often answered by evidence (or a lack of evidence) of racial animus, not evidence of mental illness.

A criminal defendant may violently attack his neighbor both because of the neighbor’s race and because the defendant suffers from a mental illness that makes it challenging for him to control his behavior. Indeed, the very act of violently attacking one’s neighbor suggests that the defendant is not mentally sound.

In most cases short of insanity, then, mental health evidence is besides the point. As long as the defendant would not have attacked his neighbor if the neighbor were a different race, the defendant has committed the attack “because of” race within the meaning of § 3631(a) and § 245(b)(2). Any other approach would allow mental health defenses to swallow the hate crimes laws.

Nazi memorabilia

Hudak also challenges the district court’s evidentiary rulings admitting evidence of his Nazi memorabilia. The relevant evidence included two Nazi flags, a swastika patch and a ring bearing the Iron Cross, all of which was recovered from Hudak’s home, plus the testimony of a state probation officer who saw a Nazi flag draped over Hudak’s bedroom door.

The district court did not abuse its discretion. Hudak was on notice that there might be consequences if he presented a defense that placed his Nazi memorabilia at issue. Yet he chose to do so anyways by framing himself as a military collector. How much meaning to assign the Nazi memorabilia was ultimately a question of weight, not admissibility.

Affirmed.

United States v. Hudak, Case No. 24-4313, Oct. 7, 2025. 4th Cir. (Wilkinson), from MDNC at Greensboro (Osteen Jr.). Eugene Ernest Lester III for Appellant. Brant S. Levine for Appellee. VLW 025-2-379. 13 pp.