Employment: Professor’s complaint dismissed as implausible

Where a college professor failed to plead facts making its plausible that his non-selection for tenure was for discriminatory or retaliatory reasons, his suit was dismissed.

Background

The first time Madhusudan Katti sought tenure at North Carolina State University, his application was denied. The next time—three years later—it was approved. According to Katti, the “only” plausible inference from that experience is that the first tenure decision was an act of discrimination and retaliation. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim.

Discrimination

Katti’s claims of race discrimination were brought under the Equal Protection Clause and § 1981. To plead an equal protection violation, a plaintiff must first plausibly allege that the defendant treated him differently than someone else “similarly situated” in all relevant respects. In the context of university tenure, “similarly situated in all relevant respects” means that the tenure committee has adjudged the plaintiff and his comparator to have a similar quality of “scholarship, . . . pedagogy, [and] . . . service to the university,” or similar performance in the other categories they deem essential.

Katti’s allegations in this case fall well short of that standard. The chart at ¶ 209 of his amended complaint pointed out that Katti did not receive tenure in 2020 while five white professors did between 2013 and 2023. But it contained no information whatsoever about the quality of those professors’ work.

The chart at ¶ 213 fares slightly better by pointing out that Katti published more articles, delivered more conference presentations and secured more grants than a white colleague who received tenure. But scholarship quantity is an imperfect metric for scholarship quality. While Katti’s higher numbers could make a difference if all other things were equal, “things, when teaching qualifications are being examined at the university level, are practically never equal.”

In any event, Katti’s complaint did not suggest that research productivity was the primary reason he was denied tenure. Instead, Goodwin and Gower’s criticisms of Katti—which Katti believes were the driving force behind his denial—focused on his teaching, mentorship and administrative skills.

Katti’s allegations fall short for another reason. Neither chart stated whether the individual defendants were even involved in the decisions to grant tenure to the white professors identified as comparators. Without an allegation that these defendants were involved, there is no way the district court could have reasonably inferred that they treated Katti and a similarly situated comparator differently.

To plead a § 1981 violation, a plaintiff must plausibly allege “both that the defendant intended to discriminate on the basis of race, and that the discrimination interfered with a contractual interest.” In this case, Goodwin and Gower’s persistent criticisms of Katti’s teaching and mentorship provide ample basis for their belief that his work was subpar.

Katti next asks the court to infer intentional race discrimination from the fact that Goodwin did not recuse herself from the Interdisciplinary Retention, Promotion, and Tenure Committee and that Gower and Zagacki did not compel her to recuse. However Goodwin’s belief that Katti was “incapable/incompetent” was the product of her experience co-teaching a class with Katti; it was precisely the kind of informed perspective the committee had every reason to solicit.

And while different treatment between a plaintiff and a comparator who is similarly situated in all relevant respects can support an inference of intentional discrimination under § 1981, as we explained above, Katti’s amended complaint falls well short of alleging a similarly situated comparator.

First Amendment

Katti’s First Amendment claim is that he was unlawfully denied tenure in retaliation for his “non-traditional teaching methods.” It is possible that teaching methods, in another case, could fall within the zone of protection afforded by the First Amendment to speech related to “scholarship and teaching.” But that is a question this court need not now address, because Katti disclaims the scholarship and teaching label altogether. Katti has thus not identified speech that could form the basis of a First Amendment claim.

Affirmed.

Concurring/dissenting opinion

Heytens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part:

I agree the district court properly dismissed Katti’s First Amendment claim and his race discrimination claim against Jean Goodwin. But I would reverse the district court’s dismissal of Katti’s individual-capacity race discrimination claims against the four other defendants.

Katti v. Arden, Case No. 24-2054, Dec. 2, 2025. 4th Cir. (Wilkinson), from EDNC at Raleigh (Myers II). Valerie Bateman for Appellant. Lindsay Vance Smith for Appellees. VLW 025-2-433. 22 pp.