Negligence – Defendants sued for not maintaining apartment fire prevention equipment

Where a landlord and property manager moved to dismiss the negligence per se claim brought by a woman injured in an apartment fire, their motion was denied. The Virginia Statewide Fire Prevention Code requires parties to maintain existing fire prevention and safety systems and, here, the woman alleged the defendants breached their duty to maintain that equipment.

Background

Sarah Broggin was seriously injured in an apartment fire. She is suing her landlord and her landlord’s property manager for negligence and negligence per se based on how they maintained the property and its fire monitoring equipment. Defendants have moved to strike paragraph 15 of the second amended complaint and two attached exhibits, and have also moved to dismiss Broggin’s
negligence per se claims.

Motion to strike

Defendants argue that Exhibit 1 — which is a June 22, 2021 report from the City of Lynchburg showing active fire and building code violations at James Crossing Apartments — is “immaterial and impertinent” because it does not specifically reference Broggin’s building and is dated two years before the fire. They also assert that Exhibit 2 — which is a one-page excerpt of the Fire Investigation Report — is “immaterial” because it is incomplete and fails to provide meaningful context. Defendants also seek to strike paragraph 15 of the second amended complaint for similar reasons.

Immaterial matter is “that which has no essential or important relationship to the claim for relief,” and, relatedly, impertinent material “consists of statements that do not pertain to, and are not necessary to resolve, the disputed issues.” The court finds that
Exhibits 1 and 2 and paragraph 15 clearly relate to Broggin’s claims that defendants were negligent and negligent per se by not maintaining their property in a safe and lawful manner.

Specifically, Exhibit 1 shows that defendants were in violation of the fire and building codes (at least in 2021), which, if unrebutted, could create a permissible inference that those violations or similar violations existed at the time of the fire. Likewise, Exhibit 2 suggests that the fire department official responsible for investigating the June 6, 2023, blaze witnessed four non-functioning fire detectors at the scene. These exhibits support Broggin’s theory that she would not have been trapped in a dangerous apartment fire had defendants complied with their obligations under Virginia law.

Because defendants have failed to show that Exhibits 1 and 2 and paragraph 15 “have no possible relation or logical connection to the subject matter of the controversy” and that they “may cause some form of significant prejudice,” defendants have not satisfied Rule 12(f)’s standard to strike and their motion must be denied.

Negligence per se

To state a claim for negligence per se under Virginia law, a plaintiff must allege “(1) that there was a statute or an ordinance; (2) that the injured party was within the class of persons for whose protection or benefit the statute was designed; (3) that the harm which occurred was the type of harm the statute was designed to protect against; and (4) that the violation of the statute must have been the proximate cause of the injury.”

Defendants first argue that the Virginia Statewide Fire Prevention Code, or SFPC, does not apply because Broggin’s apartment building was built in 1970 and the SFPC only requires defendants to maintain the fire equipment and systems that were in place at the time of construction. The court disagrees. The fact that the apartment building in question was built in 1970 is not a get-out-of-jail-free card.

While the SFPC may not require defendants to install new, state-of-the-art fire monitoring and suppression systems, the SFPC does require defendants to maintain existing fire prevention and safety systems. Broggin’s second amended complaint sufficiently alleges that her apartment building had some fire safety equipment and that defendants breached their duty to maintain that equipment. At this stage, Broggin is not required to allege anything more to state a claim for negligence per se based on the SFPC.

Defendants’ motion to strike denied. Defendants’ partial motion to dismiss denied.

Broggin v. Atlantic Housing Foundation, Inc. Case No. 6:25-cv-00013, March 20, 2026. WDVA at Lynchburg (Moon). VLW 026-3-127. 6 pp.

Full-Text Opinion

VLW 026-3-127
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