Wills and trusts – Trial court violated administrator’s due process rights

Where the trial court dismissed an estate administrator’s petition for the court’s aid and guidance without giving him sufficient prior notice, its dismissal order was reversed.

Background

Jack Yetiv is the administrator and a 50 percent beneficiary of his deceased brother’s $4 million estate. The Estate is also shared by Yetiv’s two nieces, who each own 25 percent. After a dispute between Yetiv and the nieces, Yetiv hired legal representation using Estate funds.

Norfolk City Commissioner of Accounts, B. Cullen Gibson, determined that Yetiv was obligated to reimburse the Estate for the attorney’s fees, though she had previously approved Yetiv’s accounting of some of them as Estate expenses. A series of disagreements over Gibson’s determination led Yetiv to file a petition for the court’s aid and guidance, and for Gibson to file a rule to show cause why Yetiv had not reimbursed the Estate.

The trial court discussed Yetiv’s petition and eventually dismissed it outside of the hearing on the basis that Gibson had quasi-judicial immunity and was thus not subject to suit from Yetiv.

Due process

Yetiv claims that the trial court’s holding the show cause hearing when it did and later dismissing the petition with prejudice violated his due process rights as codified in Virginia statute, the Virginia Constitution and the United States Constitution. While the trial court made no judgment on the notice and service issues related to the show cause rule, it did rule on the petition without giving Yetiv the chance to be heard.

Though Yetiv did submit an evidentiary supplement, this is not a replacement for adequate notice, or the right to present an argument, submit evidence, cross-examine adversary witnesses or any other essential right he would have in an ore tenus hearing. Further, the trial court made its judgment based only on the discussion at the show cause hearing and the evidentiary supplement.

While these do not make the notice and service issues related to the show cause hearing final judgments, they do render Yetiv’s due process rights infringed related to the petition. Thus, the dismissal must be reversed and the trial court must provide Yetiv the opportunity to be heard on that matter.

Standing

Yetiv claims the trial court erred in dismissing the petition and thereby putting him, as a fiduciary, in an impossible position with respect to the status of Gibson’s earlier approval of accountings, the propriety of the reimbursement demand and Gibson’s obligation to hold a debts and demands hearing. He also claims error in the dismissal related to the trial court’s ruling that he lacks standing to sue Gibson because he is not a Virginia-licensed attorney and its failure to allow Yetiv to cure the standing issue by allowing him to stand pro se or pro hac vice.

In Yetiv’s “Written Statement in Lieu of Transcript,” he claims that “[a]lthough the Court did not make a ruling at the hearing, the Court stated that it would likely dismiss the Petition because Yetiv did not have ‘standing’ to pursue his petition.” Gibson stating that the paragraph’s “reference to the Court ‘holding that Yetiv lacked “standing”’ is erroneous. The court did not make a finding at the hearing, nor in the appealed Order, regarding Yetiv’s standing.”

The trial court, in its own response, sustained Gibson’s objection. The trial court also explicitly contradicted Yetiv’s rendering of the facts on the issue of standing in its dismissal order. Far from having decided that Yetiv lacked standing, the trial court refrained from deciding on that point.

The foregoing renders the standing issue outside the limited jurisdiction of this court. This also means the standing problem does not exist at all. If the trial court raises no problem with Yetiv’s standing, then there is no problem for him to cure.

Immunity

Since Yetiv’s right to be heard was infringed by the trial court’s sua sponte dismissal, this court need not address the substantive issue that formed the basis of its judgment. Accordingly, it reaches no conclusion about whether Gibson is protected by quasi-judicial immunity in this case.

Reversed and remanded.

Yetiv v. Gibson, Case No. 0190-25-1, June 9, 2026. CAV (unpublished opinion) (White). From the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk (Martin Jr.). Jack Z. Yetiv (William W. Sleeth III; Jonathan W. Gonzalez; Timothy J. Lyle; Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani, LLP, on briefs), for appellants. Flora T. Hezel, Senior Assistant Attorney General (Jason S. Miyares, Attorney General; Steven G. Popps, Chief Deputy Attorney General; Leslie A.T. Haley, Deputy Attorney General, on brief), for appellee B. Cullen Gibson, Commissioner of Accounts. VLW 026-7-236. 12 pp.

Full-Text Opinion
VLW 026-7-236