Undisclosed evidence not ‘material’ to defense

Although South Carolina failed to produce three pieces of evidence during the defendant’s murder trial where he was convicted and sentenced to death, because the undisclosed evidence was not material, his habeas petition was denied. 

Background

Marion Bowman was convicted of murdering Kandee Martin and was sentenced to death. During his state post-conviction relief, or PCR, and federal habeas proceedings, Bowman argued that South Carolina’s failure to produce three pieces of evidence violated his due process rights because he could have used that evidence to impeach prosecution witnesses. Every court to address this argument has deemed the undisclosed evidence not material.

Richardson memo

During the PCR proceedings, a memorandum written by Samuel Richardson, a prosecution investigator who interviewed a jailhouse informant who claimed that Bowman’s cousin (James Taiwan Gadson) had confessed to the murder, came to light. That document recorded the same critical information as a handwritten note that was provided to the defense by Rickie Davis, an inmate who was housed at separate times with both Bowman and Gadson: that Gadson allegedly confessed to Davis that he killed Martin. Bowman argues that he could have used the memo to question Richardson, Davis or Gadson at trial and the memo would have boosted his effort to paint Gadson as an alternative suspect.

Because the memo constituted multiple layers of hearsay, to question Richardson about the substance of his memo, defense counsel likely would have had to present Davis as a witness, and Davis would have had to deny telling Richardson the information recorded in the memo. But as defense counsel knew before trial—and the PCR hearings reinforced— Davis’s testimony would have harmed, not helped, Bowman’s case. And when it comes to impeaching Gadson, the memo also was cumulative of Davis’s handwritten note, which the defense already possessed.

Gadson report

Bowman next focuses on a mental health report that was prepared to determine if Gadson was competent to stand trial. Bowman argues it would have been valuable to impeach Gadson’s memory as the sole eyewitness to testify about the murder. The report was a double-edged sword, however, and its value for additional impeachment of Gadson’s recall was minimal.

The report’s ultimate conclusion that Gadson was competent to stand trial, moreover, would also undermine any defense effort to suggest that he was mentally unstable. If the defense had chosen to use the Gadson report at trial, the state could have been expected to characterize the report as a professional assessment that Gadson was sane and his memory reliable.

Johnson

Finally, Bowman argues that he was not informed about unindicted charges pending against Hiram Johnson in an unrelated case at the time of Bowman’s trial. Bowman contends that defense counsel could have questioned Johnson about them during trial to suggest to the jury that Johnson was testifying against Bowman in hopes of receiving favorable treatment from the prosecution with respect to those unrelated charges.

The court agrees that evidence of unresolved charges pending against him in the same prosecutor’s office would have had independent impeachment value. At the same time, there are reasons to think this information would have been of limited effect.

Cumulative materiality

The court now assesses the cumulative materiality of the three pieces of undisclosed evidence to determine whether the state violated Bowman’s due process rights. It must evaluate the withheld evidence “in the context of the entire record” at trial and determine “whether there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Having done so, the court concludes that there is no such reasonable probability.

The undisclosed evidence, at best, would have undercut Johnson’s and Gadson’s reliability in the eyes of the jury. But both men’s testimony was consistent with the other evidence offered at trial. This was not a thin or circumstantial case, or one that relied on the testimony of one, or even two, crucial witnesses to connect Bowman to the crime. 

To the contrary, the state offered a veritable mountain of evidence linking Bowman to the murder. Even discounting their testimony based on Johnson’s motivation to please the state, Gadson’s mental health and Davis’s recanted story about Gadson confessing in prison, the evidence against Bowman remains forceful and compelling. The court therefore must affirm the district court’s denial of Bowman’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

Affirmed.

Bowman v. Stirling, Case No. 20-12, Aug. 16, 2022. 4th Cir. (Rushing), from DSC at Beaufort (Wooten). Teresa L. Norris for Appellant. William Joseph Maye for Appellees. VLW 022-2-205. 35 pp.