Sufficiently adverse: Mistaken belief in lifetime rights didn’t contradict adverse possession claim

A trial court erred by dismissing a woman’s complaint after finding that her assertion of lifetime rights was inconsistent with her claim that she adversely possessed the family home over her brothers’ objections, the Court of Appeals of Virginia has held.

After living with and caring for her mother until her death, the plaintiff asserted lifetime rights to the property. The trial court sustained the estate’s demurrer to the plaintiff’s adverse possession claim.

But Judge Dominique A. Callins found that the plaintiff’s assertion of lifetime rights didn’t unambiguously contradict her later allegations of adverse possession.

“The factual allegations made in [the Plaintiff’s] complaint were sufficient to state a valid cause of action by alleging that her possession of the property was ‘actual, hostile, exclusive, visible, and continuous … under a claim of right, for the statutory period of 15 years,’” she said.

Joined by Judges Randolf A. Beales and Frank K. Friedman, Callins reversed and remanded Heath v. The Estate of Louise T. Heath (VLW 024-7-132).

No trespassing

Louise Heath resided on property in Hanover and had seven children — Linda and her six brothers — each of whom she named as heirs in her will. Linda lived with and cared for her mother.

After their mother’s death in 1988, Linda continued to reside at the property over her brothers’ objections. Two of the brothers were executors of their mother’s estate and each brother wanted to sell the property.

After her brothers entered the property and shut off its power while she was at work, Linda mailed a “no trespass notice” to them and asserted her lifetime rights to the property.

The estate later defeated a holographic will bequeathing to Linda a life estate in the property. Nonetheless, Linda continued to live at the property.

In 2022, Linda filed a complaint with the letter attached seeking a declaratory judgment that she had adversely possessed the property. The estate’s demurrer argued that the will gave the property equally to the heirs.

[W]hile it is true that a ‘court considering a demurrer’ ‘may ignore a party’s factual allegations contradicted by the terms of authentic, unambiguous documents that properly are a part of the pleadings,’ [the plaintiff’s] Letter was not such an unambiguous document, allowing the circuit court to ignore the factual allegations delineated in [the plaintiff’s] complaint.

— Judge Dominique A. Callins

According to the estate, Linda’s letter proved that she mistakenly believed herself to be a life tenant during her possession, which wasn’t adverse to the remaindermen. Linda responded that her allegations demonstrated her hostility under a claim of right against the estate.

Sustaining the demurrer, the circuit court explained that Linda’s belief in her life estate contradicted her adverse possession claim. Her letter merely advised the remaindermen of her intent to enforce lifetime rights.

Linda appealed.

Life estate

Callins cited the Supreme Court of Virginia’s description of a life estate in Larsen v. Stack as “an established legal concept with inherent boundaries governing its operation and legal force.”

The Larsen court said a life estate is generally “[a]n estate held ‘only for the duration of a specified person’s life, usu[ally] the possessor’s,’” during which the holder has the right of possession, full enjoyment and use of the land and all profits.

In Goin v. Absher, the Supreme Court found the phrase “‘lifetime right’ may be read as to convey an amorphous, but unbounded property interest, akin to a fee simple, ‘an estate of perpetuity’ that ‘confers an unlimited power of alienation,’ such that ‘no person is capable of having a greater estate or interest in land.’”

Here, Callins pointed out that, “[u]nlike a ‘life estate,’ a ‘lifetime right’ is not an established legal concept or even a recognized term of art in the realm of Virginia property law. Thus, the phrase ‘lifetime right’ provides no glimmer as to the extent, exact content or even the rough contours of the right at issue.”

Linda’s letter indicated that she believed her lifetime right to exclusive possession of the property; Callins noted that wasn’t a right unique to a life estate.

“Moreover, while a ‘life estate‘ is an estate of specified duration, it is unclear whether a ‘lifetime right’ is similarly delimited, and was used by Linda to assert a life tenancy and, in turn, establish the Heath Brothers as remaindermen,” the judge wrote.

Further, Linda’s warnings did little to clarify the nature of the subject right, beyond indicating her belief that she had the exclusive right to possess the property.

“This, by itself, does not show unequivocally that Linda believed that she had a life estate interest in the Property, since adverse possession bespeaks an ‘intention to appropriate and use the land as [one’s] own to the exclusion of all others,’” Callins said, citing Grappo v. Blanks.

It was unclear what underlying right Linda aimed to vindicate by sending her letter.

“Thus, while it is true that a ‘court considering a demurrer’ ‘may ignore a party’s factual allegations contradicted by the terms of authentic, unambiguous documents that properly are a part of the pleadings,’ Linda’s Letter was not such an unambiguous document, allowing the circuit court to ignore the factual allegations delineated in Linda’s complaint,” Callins said.

Thus, the circuit court erred by ignoring Linda’s allegations because they weren’t “contradicted by the terms of authentic, unambiguous documents that properly [we]re a part of the pleadings.’”

Sufficiently adverse

Again looking to Grappo, Callins said establishing adverse possession required a claimant to prove actual, exclusive, visible and continuous possession under a claim of right for 15 years.

Linda alleged that her exclusive possession of the property over her brothers’ objections began when their mother died in 1988. She later posted “No Trespassing” signs and erected a fence around the property.

“Through the initiation of this action, Linda continued to reside at the Property, paying taxes and other administrative costs,” Callins noted, adding that Linda allegedly possessed the property for the minimum statutory period of 15 years.

“Indeed, 15 years from Louise’s death would have passed in 2003; Linda alleges to have maintained exclusive possession of the home from 1988 through the date of the filing of her complaint,” the judge wrote.

Here, Linda’s complaint sufficiently stated a valid adverse possession claim.

“The extent and nature of the interest Linda intended to adversely possess — whether a life estate or something else — is a proper question for the factfinder, and not for the circuit court on demurrer or for this Court on appeal,” Callins concluded.