Consumer Protection: Case remanded following dismissal of federal claim

Where the court dismissed the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act claim, which was the only federal claim, it remanded the state claims to the circuit court.

Background

Deangelo C. Johnson initially filed this lawsuit in the circuit court, raising one claim under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, or FDCPA, and five claims under Virginia law. Defendants All Access Services LLC and Exeter Finance LLC removed the case to this court and filed a motion to dismiss. Johnson has filed a motion to remand.

FDCPA

The primary basis upon which defendants removed this case to federal court was plaintiff’s claim under the FDCPA. In his complaint, plaintiff acknowledges that Exeter was “a ‘Secured Party’ under [Virginia Code] § 8.9A-102(a)(73).” This fact is further demonstrated by the contract which plaintiff referenced in his initial filing, and upon which plaintiff bases his right to ownership over the Ford Taurus.

The contract granted a security interest in the vehicle to the creditor, and it allowed for repossession of the vehicle in the event that plaintiff defaulted. Given that plaintiff breached the contract and was in default, Exeter, as a secured party, had the contractual and statutory right to repossess the vehicle. Therefore, defendants had a possessory right to the Ford Taurus at the time they repossessed it.

Consequently, based on the facts before the court, plaintiff has no cognizable claim against defendants under 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(6)(A). Although § 1692f contains a long inventory of other subsections that prohibit particular debt collection practices, those other subsections are completely inapplicable to plaintiff’s claim.

State claims

“A court has ‘wide latitude in determining whether or not to retain jurisdiction over state claims when all federal claims have been extinguished.’” Both the Fourth Circuit and the Supreme Court of the United States strongly favor dismissing state law claims if the federal claims are dismissed before trial.

Here, not only has plaintiff’s sole federal claim been extinguished, but plaintiff has also raised a question that is apparently a novel issue of state law. Virginia Code § 6.2-2217(B) requires that “[b]orrowers shall be permitted to recover personal items from repossessed motor vehicles promptly and at no cost.” Plaintiff contends that defendants violated this statute by failing to “promptly” return his personal items that were left in the Ford Taurus when it was repossessed.

Virginia Code § 6.2-2000 provides a list of definitions, but it does not define the meaning of “promptly.” Furthermore, neither plaintiff nor defendants cite to caselaw where courts have evaluated the meaning of the word “promptly” in § 6.2-2217(B), and the court is likewise not aware of any. Under these circumstances, whether three days constitutes a prompt return of plaintiff’s wallet, ID and debit card is a novel question of state law. On balance then, given that the federal question will be dismissed and given the novel question of state law, there is no good reason to keep this case in federal court.

Defendants’ motion to dismiss granted in part. Plaintiff’s motion to remand granted.

Johnson v. Exeter Finance LLC, Case No. 3:23-cv-833, Sept. 27, 2024. EDVA at Richmond (Hudson). VLW 024-3-536. 10 pp.