Criminal – Sex-offender convicted of providing false information

Where the police visited the residence where the sex-offender was allegedly residing on six separate occasions without finding him there, and he did not contact the police over a six-month period, the record supports the inference that the home address he provided the Sex Offender and Crimes Against Minors Registry was knowingly false.

Background

Following a bench trial, the circuit court convicted Tyrone Allen Martin of providing false information to the Sex Offender and Crimes Against Minors Registry, as a second or subsequent offense in violation of Code § 18.2-472.1. On appeal,

Martin contends that the circuit court erred in denying his motions to strike, based both on an alleged fatal variance between the evidence and the “essential averments” in the indictment and on his claim that there was insufficient evidence that he knowingly provided false information to the registry.

Indictment

Martin argues that the Commonwealth was barred from proving the indictment by showing “a mere failure to verify his information” because that basis for a conviction “was excluded from the indictment.” This court disagrees.

Martin’s indictment charged three violations of the statute in the disjunctive: that he “did feloniously and knowingly fail to register or reregister or knowingly provide false information.” Evidence of any one of the alleged violations would be sufficient to convict, without any variance with the indictment.

Martin even acknowledges that “the Commonwealth maintained that it was proceeding under a theory that [Martin] had provided false information.” But he mistakes the gravamen of that theory, answering only that his failure to respond to Trooper Brown’s requests “does not amount to a knowingly false assertion.”

The Commonwealth did not argue that Martin violated the statute by failing to verify his registration information. It instead argued that the Trooper Brown’s own unsuccessful efforts to verify Martin’s address were evidence that the address information Martin provided was in fact false and that the contrary testimony he submitted was not credible.

Indeed, the circuit court found that “if Mr. Martin were living there consistently and regularly, then [Trooper Brown] would have been able to [confirm] that at some point during those six visits.” The trooper’s inability to do so thus supported the Commonwealth’s argument that Martin was not in fact “living there consistently and regularly,” so that the home address information he provided was knowingly false, as indicted. As such, there was no fatal variance between the evidence presented and the averments in the indictment.

Sufficiency

Martin contends that an inference that his address information was in fact false was insufficient to support his conviction. He argues that Trooper Brown’s testimony that Martin “was not at the residence on the six occasions that he made unscheduled visits,” even when coupled with his own repeated failure over six months to contact the trooper, “did not refute the assertion on the re[-]registry forms that the Appellant in fact resided there.” This court again disagrees.

The evidence supported conflicting inferences, and the circuit court resolved the conflict against Martin after carefully weighing the extent of the trooper’s efforts. It acknowledged that often “the troopers do not visit enough times, but I think six times is enough to have made that verification.” The record supports the inference that the home address that Martin provided the registry was knowingly false.

The fact finder is “free to believe or disbelieve, in part or in whole, the testimony of any witness.” “[T]he credibility of a witness, the weight accorded the testimony, and the inferences to be drawn from proven facts are matters solely for the fact finder’s determination.” The record, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, supports the circuit court’s judgment.

Affirmed.

Martin v. Commonwealth, Record No. 0333-25-1, May 5, 2026. CAV (unpublished opinion) (per curiam). From the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk (LeCruise). (J. Barry McCracken, Assistant Public Defender, on brief), for appellant. (Jason S. Miyares, Attorney General; Andrew T. Hull, Assistant Attorney General, on brief), for appellee. VLW 026-7-178. 8 pp.

Full-Text Opinion
VLW 026-7-178

• Martin v. Commonwealth