Employment: Court decertifies collective/class action in wage suit

Where there are disparate factual and employment settings and different defenses, and the defendant would be prejudiced from having to defend itself against multiple claims involving disparate factual issues in one case, the court decertified the collective action and proposed class in a suit brought by sheriff’s deputies for unpaid wages.

Background

Christopher Hatcher and others sued the County of Hanover over its failure to pay members of the sheriff’s department for “mark-on duty” time prior to the start of their scheduled shift(s). Now before the court is the County’s motion to decertify the conditionally-certified collective action and class previously certified by this court.

Standard

“In considering a motion to decertify alleging dissimilarity of the conditionally certified class, district courts have typically applied three factors to aid in this determination: (1) the disparate factual and employment settings of the individual plaintiffs; (2) defenses which appear to be individual to each plaintiff; and (3) fairness and procedural considerations.”

First factor

As to the first factor, there are significant differences in the collective action members’ job duties and whether they responded to calls while “marked on” but before the official start of their shifts. These differences have a direct bearing on plaintiffs’ FLSA claim. There are also differences between plaintiffs with respect to responding to calls made by dispatch on the way to headquarters.

Plaintiffs contend that they “were all subject to the same requirement and practice that they mark on duty before their shift but were not paid until their shift started.” However, in ruling on the parties’ cross motions for summary judgment, the court found that there exists a material dispute of fact regarding whether plaintiffs “marked on” when they were driving to work, and whether they were on duty when they were “marked on.” Based on the differences between the collective members, the disparate factual and employment settings of plaintiffs favor decertification.

Second factor

As to the second consideration when weighing decertification, the court finds that the disparate factual and employment factors of each plaintiff will likely give rise to defenses that will be “individual to each Plaintiff.” This factor favors decertification as well.

Third factor

Under the third decertification factor, the court “must determine whether it can coherently manage the class in a manner that will not prejudice any party.” Here, the fairness and procedural considerations factor weighs in favor of decertification. The collective action is composed of only six members. As a result, the court concludes that limited prejudice would inure to plaintiffs as a result of decertification. Further, decertification would not result in “hundreds of mini trials.” However, proceeding as a collective action would prejudice the county, which would be required to defend itself against multiple claims involving disparate factual issues in one case.

Class decertification

The Fourth Circuit “ha[s] repeatedly recognized that Rule 23 contains an implicit threshold requirement that the members of a proposed class be readily identifiable.” Because the class definition could allow identification of the class members by objective criteria, the court concludes that the class meets the ascertainability requirement.

Deputy Hatcher, however, as the sole class representative, cannot “fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class” because he did not mark on with dispatch, unlike other deputies. And, in any event, the significant differences outlined earlier – regarding the collective action members’ job duties, whether they “marked on” such that they were available to receive service calls from dispatch and whether they responded to calls while “marked on” but before the official start of their shifts, are applicable to the 265 class members and have direct bearing on plaintiffs’ FLSA claim. Thus, the court concludes that the class fails the predominance requirement.

Defendant’s motion to decertify granted.

Hatcher v. County of Hanover, Case No. 3:23-cv-325, Sept. 30, 2025. EDVA at Richmond (Lauck). VLW 025-3-420. 29 pp.