Search and Seizure: Search of bedroom was within scope of warrant

Where the warrant authorized the search of the entire house, and nothing about the first-floor bedroom distinguished it as a discrete area that was not accessible to the target of the warrant or subject to search under the warrant, the motion to suppress filed by the occupant of that bedroom was denied.

Background

Shelly Hamm entered a conditional plea of guilty to possessing methamphetamine after the circuit court denied her motion to suppress evidence.

Analysis

As a general rule, “a search warrant directed against a multiple-occupancy structure is invalid if it fails to describe the particular sub-unit to be searched.” Hamm argues that the warrant did not properly authorize the search of what she characterizes as her bedroom. This is so, she contends, because it did not specifically describe her bedroom, a sub-unit within a single-family home, as a separate identified area to be searched.

But the evidence, viewed under the proper standard, established that the bedroom Hamm describes as hers was not an independent sub-unit of the house. She and Trent did not have separate living spaces within the single structure. Hamm presumably occupied a bedroom on the main level of the house while his bedroom was in the basement. Assuming she lived there, they necessarily shared access to the kitchen, dining area and living room on the main floor. And each had access to the other’s bedroom due to an absence of external locks on the bedroom doors and the door to the basement.

The warrant here authorized the search of the entire house. And the record shows that the house was, in fact, a single-family residence rather than a “multiple occupancy structure.” Consistent with the evidence, the affidavit indicated that Trent lived there. Although the affidavit acknowledged that he “resid[ed o]n the lower level,” nothing in the record suggests that the structure was anything but a single-family residence. No unit numbers delineated separate residences, and the building had only one mailbox. No evidence proved that the door between the basement stairway and the main level had a lock on it.

And in any event, when the deputies arrived, they found Trent on the main level of the house where the shared common areas of the kitchen and living room were located. As the circuit court found, this fact showed that Trent had freedom of movement in the house beyond the basement. Additionally, the door to the first-floor bedroom at issue had no deadbolt or chain lock, making it similarly readily accessible to Trent.

That the basement had a separate entrance is not dispositive, as many single-family homes have front, back, side and basement entrance doors. Apparently, Hamm occupied a bedroom in the same house that Trent occupied, and the evidence proved that Trent had physical access to the entire house.

Hamm’s purse was in a bedroom in the single-family home in which Trent lived. Because the bedroom in which Hamm’s purse was found was not a separate apartment within the building or a separate identified living unit, the search of the bedroom and her purse fell within the scope of the warrant to search the house.

Hamm argues that the deputies should have known that the bedroom she contends was hers was separate from Trent’s basement area and stopped their search before entering it. But Hamm’s bedroom was not a separate unit within the house. Nothing about the first-floor bedroom distinguished it as a discrete area that was not accessible to Trent or subject to search under the warrant.

Finally, Hamm argues that the deputies should not have searched her person merely because she was in the home. But the deputies did not search Hamm’s person. Rather, they searched an unattended purse after they found it in a bedroom with ordinary residential doorknobs, from which no evidence indicated others in the residence could be excluded. Acting under a warrant that authorized a search of the single-family house for drugs, the deputies reasonably searched the purse pursuant to the warrant.

The circuit court’s denial of Hamm’s motion to suppress is suppressed. The case is remanded, however, solely for the correction of clerical errors in the conviction and sentencing orders.

Affirmed and remanded.

Hamm v. Commonwealth, Record No. 1183-24-3, July 1, 2025. CAV (Graff Decker). From the Circuit Court of Patrick County (Brinks). Samantha Offutt Thames, Senior Appellate Counsel (Virginia Indigent Defense Commission, on briefs), for appellant. Susan Hallie Hovey-Murray, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S. Miyares, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee. VLW 025-7-167. 10 pp.