Tort – Court clarifies scope of immunity under child abuse reporting statute

A nonmandatory reporter who makes a good-faith complaint regarding suspected child abuse to law enforcement, without speaking to a Department of Social Services employee, is not entitled to the immunity from civil liability provided by Virginia Code § 63.2-1512

Background

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit entered a certification order asking this court to answer a determinative question of Virginia law presented in Cupp v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 154 F.4th 178 (4th Cir. 2025). Pursuant to Article VI, Section 1 of the Constitution of Virginia and Rule 5:40, this court agreed to answer the following question posed by the Fourth Circuit: “Is a nonmandatory reporter who made a good-faith complaint regarding suspected child abuse to law enforcement without speaking to a Department of Social Services employee entitled to the immunity from civil liability provided by Virginia Code § 63.2-1512?”

Analysis

Code § 63.2-1512 provides specified individuals with immunity “from any civil or criminal liability in connection” with certain reports or other activities related to suspected child abuse and neglect so long as the specified individual who made the report or engaged in the activity did not “act[] in bad faith or with malicious intent.” The statute expressly provides such immunity in four discrete circumstances: (1) a “report pursuant to § 63.2-1509”; (2) “a complaint pursuant to § 63.2-1510”; (3) when a child is taken “into custody pursuant to § 63.2-1517” and (4) when an individual “participates in a judicial proceeding resulting” from one of the other three categories.

By its terms, the certified question is limited to “a nonmandatory reporter” who seeks immunity from civil liability for making a complaint related to suspected child abuse or neglect. As a result, the only potentially relevant category specified in Code § 63.2-1512 relates to complaints made “pursuant to § 63.2-1510[.]”

The statutory language is specific and clear. As pertinent here, Code § 63.2-1510 authorizes a nonmandatory reporter to make a complaint regarding suspected child abuse or neglect to the appropriate local department of social services or by calling the Department’s “toll-free child abuse and neglect hotline.” Absent the limited exception for circumstances when an employee of the local department of social services is suspected of having committed the abuse or neglect, Code § 63.2-1510 does not authorize a nonmandatory reporter to make such a complaint to any other person or entity.

Accordingly, a complaint made by a nonmandatory reporter to a person or entity other than the local department or the Department’s toll-free child abuse and neglect hotline is not “a complaint pursuant to § 63.2-1510” for the purpose of determining a person’s entitlement to immunity under Code § 63.2-1512.

The unambiguous statutory language makes clear that the answer to the certified question is “no.” As relevant to the question posed, only complaints made pursuant to Code § 63.2-1510 could trigger the immunity provided for in Code § 63.2-1512.

Because Code § 63.2-1510 only authorizes complaints to the local department, the Department’s toll-free hotline or, in circumstances not present here, to a local court, complaints to any other person or entity, including “a good-faith complaint regarding suspected child abuse to law enforcement without speaking to a Department of Social Services employee[,]” are not authorized by Code § 63.2-1510. As a result, such unauthorized complaints by a nonmandatory reporter cannot trigger the immunity protections found in Code § 63.2-1512.

Defendants argue that public policy concerns and the absurdity canon of statutory construction dictate that the court go beyond the statutory language and grant immunity to people who do not fall within the language of the statute. This court finds neither argument convincing.

Certified question answered in the negative.

Cupp v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., Record No. 250902, April 2, 2026 (Russell Jr.). Upon a question of law certified by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. VLW 026-6-015. 10 pp.

Full-Text Opinion

VLW 026-6-015
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