Criminal  – Court did not err in refusing to allow withdrawal of guilty plea

Where the defendant argued he should have been allowed to withdraw his guilty plea, because his sentence departed from the term in the plea agreement, this argument was rejected. Although the plea agreement specified that the court would impose the sentence “[i]f no problems [arose] during his [presentence] release,” the conviction order expressly conditioned presentence release on “abstinence from alcohol” and the defendant tested positive for consuming alcohol and admitted drinking it during this period.

Background

Daniel Lee Sine pleaded guilty under a plea agreement to malicious wounding. The circuit court convicted Sine and sentenced him to a term of 20 years’ incarceration, with 16 years suspended. In this appeal, Sine asserts that the sentence the trial court imposed departed from the term specified in the plea agreement, so the court erred by not granting his post-judgment motion to set the sentence aside and resentence him according to the plea agreement, or alternatively, to withdraw his guilty plea.

Post-judgment motion

Sine, through counsel, affirmatively requested a sentence at the low end of the guidelines range at the sentencing hearing. When the trial court explained the sentence at Sine’s request, he personally replied, “Awesome.” Sine’s post-judgment request to be resentenced in accordance with the plea agreement repudiated his request at the sentencing hearing. Thus, his argument on appeal that the court erred by not granting his request for resentencing is waived.

Withdrawal

Under Code § 19.2-296, a “court is permitted to grant a motion to withdraw a guilty plea after it has imposed the sentence only to correct a manifest injustice.” “A manifest injustice ‘amounts to an obvious miscarriage of justice’ or ‘[a] direct, obvious, and observable error in a trial court.’” It includes “an involuntary guilty plea or a plea based on a plea agreement that has been rescinded.”

Although “a plea based on a plea agreement that has been rescinded” is a “miscarriage of justice,” the plea agreement in this case was not rescinded; Sine breached it. The plea agreement specified that the court would impose the sentence “[i]f no problems [arose] during his [presentence] release.” The conviction order expressly conditioned Sine’s presentence release on “abstinence from alcohol.” The court also explained at the plea hearing that “in order to get the benefit” of the agreement, Sine needed to “go to probation,” “follow their rules” and consume “[n]o alcohol.”

Even setting aside the assault and battery charge, Sine tested positive for consuming alcohol and admitted drinking it. Under these circumstances, there was no manifest injustice that required the court to grant a post-sentence motion to withdraw the guilty plea under Code § 19.2-296.

Affirmed.

Sine v. Commonwealth, Record No 0696-25-3, April 7, 2026. CAV (Humphreys). From the Circuit Court of Botetourt County (Branscom). John S. Koehler (The Law Office of John S. Steele, PLLC, on briefs), for appellant. Sandra M. Workman, Senior Assistant Attorney General (Jason S. Miyares, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee. VLW 026-7-129. 8 pp.

Full-Text Opinion

VLW 026-7-129
Virginia Lawyers Weekly