Criminal – Officer impermissibly extended traffic stop

Where a law enforcement officer immediately abandoned the purpose of a traffic stop and engaged in a criminal investigation unrelated to the basis of the stop, the defendant’s motion to suppress the firearm and his inculpatory statements should have been granted.

Background

Nathaniel Martin was stopped in a vehicle by an officer in the Monongahela National Forest. The officer discovered firearms in the vehicle. Martin was charged with felon in possession of a firearm pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(8). He moved to suppress the firearm and his inculpatory statements, contending the stop violated his Fourth Amendment rights.

The district court denied his motion, finding that the officer (Joshua Radford) did not extend the traffic stop for any purposes unrelated to the stop and thus Martin’s Fourth Amendment rights were not violated. Martin accepted a plea agreement expressly preserving his right to appeal the denial of the motion to suppress.

Analysis

Martin argues the stop was unlawful because the officer immediately abandoned the purpose of the stop and engaged in a criminal investigation unrelated to the basis of the stop. This court agrees.

Here, Radford exceeded the scope of the seizure by immediately engaging in a criminal investigation unrelated to the traffic violation warranting the stop—obstruction of traffic by parking on a single-lane bridge. Initiating the stop, Radford first informed Martin and Jarvis that he was stopping them for parking on the single-lane bridge, and then he immediately asked about the presence of firearms. During the unrecorded two minutes of the stop, he asked Jarvis for her license. The bodycam footage audio begins with Radford asking if there was anything else in the vehicle.

About a minute later, Jarvis gave Radford her license and Radford immediately requested Martin’s license and the registration for the vehicle. Approximately 45 seconds later, after receiving Martin’s license, Radford asked about the location of the first firearm. One minute after that, Radford asked again whether there was anything else in the vehicle which resulted in Jarvis confessing to the second firearm. Radford’s questions were not reasonably related in scope to the purpose of the stop and were instead focused on investigating unrelated criminal activity.

Those inquiries would have been lawful if they were conducted during the course of a diligently conducted stop, but that is not the case here because Radford abandoned the stop from the very beginning. To begin, when initiating the stop, Jarvis had already moved the car from the single-lane bridge. Radford’s purpose in conducting the traffic stop had seemingly been resolved. It makes little sense for Radford to then move on to proceed with the stop, let alone to prolong the stop to question about the presence of firearms.

Radford was not mid-stop when he began questioning about the presence of firearms. He led the stop with that question. He only briefly mentioned the traffic violation for which he stopped Jarvis and Martin and then raced to question them both about the presence of firearms and anything else “he should know about” in the vehicle.

Contrary to how the dissent views the facts, Radford was able to perform the customary checks on the occupants and vehicle at the stop’s inception but instead chose to engage in the unfounded criminal investigation about firearms. He was not “waiting for additional officer[s]” and even after obtaining Jarvis’ and Martin’s licenses and registration, he continued to ask about the presence of firearms and whether anything illegal was in the vehicle. Accordingly, Radford did not diligently pursue the purpose of the stop and impermissibly extended the stop from its inception.

No matter what the government may claim about Radford’s safety concerns, “[t]he reasonableness of a seizure depends on what the police in fact do.” Here, Radford abandoned the mission of the stop to engage in a criminal investigation unrelated to that mission, and the circumstances of the stop did not exhibit safety concerns warranting his questions.

Reversed and vacated.

Dissenting opinion

King, J., dissenting:

In my view, Radford’s questioning was more than objectively reasonable — given the totality of the circumstances that confronted him in a desolate and lonely part of the National Forest — such that there was no Fourth Amendment violation. Because I would affirm the district court, I respectfully dissent.

United States v. Martin, Case No. 25-4233, April 17, 2026. 4th Cir. (Benjamin), from SDWVA at Charleston (Berger). Lex A. Coleman for Appellant. Donald Keith Randolph for Appellee. VLW 026-2-135. 27 pp.

Full-Text Opinion

VLW 026-2-135
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