Habeas Corpus – Military courts had jurisdiction over Navy Captain’s offenses

Where a then-Navy Captain was convicted in a court martial of attempted sexual assault of a child and attempted sexual abuse of a child, among other offenses, the court rejected his argument that the military courts lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over his offenses.

Background

A general court-martial convicted former United States Navy Captain Alan Dorrbecker of attempted sexual assault of a child and attempted sexual abuse of a child, among other offenses. The military judge sentenced Dorrbecker to eight years’ confinement and dismissed him from the Navy. The Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Dorrbecker’s convictions. The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces denied further review.

Dorrbecker then petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court, arguing that the military courts lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over his offenses. The district court disagreed and dismissed Dorrbecker’s petition.

Jurisdiction

Dorrbecker claims that the court-martial lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to convict him of attempted sexual assault of a child and attempted sexual abuse of a child.  This court disagrees.

“‘Generally, there are three prerequisites that must be met for courts-martial jurisdiction to vest . . . .’” First, the “offenses with which [the] petitioner was charged” must be “proscribed by” the Uniform Code of Military Justice, or UCMJ. Second, “the accused in the court-martial proceeding [must be] a person who can be regarded as falling within the term ‘land and naval Forces.’” And third, there must be “a properly convened and composed court-martial.” All three prerequisites were met here.

Dorrbecker nevertheless argues that, because attempt under the UCMJ requires specific intent to commit the underlying crime but he had only conditional intent to assault and abuse S.M, he necessarily was convicted of an offense that “does not constitute attempt under Article 80,” and, therefore, the military courts acted without subject-matter jurisdiction. Dorrbecker’s argument confuses subject-matter jurisdiction with the merits of his convictions.

Dorrbecker’s objection that the military courts legally erred in finding that he possessed the requisite intent to be guilty of attempt under the UCMJ—a question this court does not reach—does not convert his challenge into one about subject-matter jurisdiction. Indeed, the D.C. Circuit recently addressed and rejected an argument very similar to the one Dorrbecker makes here. At bottom, “alleged errors of law or fact,” which Dorrbecker asserts here, are “distinguished from error in asserting jurisdiction.”

Review

When it comes to a petitioner’s non-jurisdictional claims, review is limited to determining whether the military courts have “dealt fully and fairly with” the claims. The record here shows that the military courts “heard [Dorrbecker] out on” his argument that conditional intent negates the specific intent required to prove an attempt offense under the UCMJ.

Nowhere does Dorrbecker suggest that his conditional intent argument was not “explored” or at least “available for exploration at the trial.” Moving to the appeal, it is clear that the Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals “fully and fairly” considered Dorrbecker’s intent argument in its published opinion.

Dorrbecker suggests that full and fair consideration was lacking because the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, or CAAF—the military’s highest court—summarily declined review of his case. This court rejects this argument. Other courts of appeals have found full and fair consideration by the military courts even where the CAAF denied a petition for review. This court does the same here.

Dorrbecker identifies no authority holding that the CAAF’s denial of a petition for review renders the military’s review as a whole “legally inadequate to resolve” an accused’s claims. And such a holding would run directly contrary to other circuits’ precedent.

Italy

Dorrbecker next argues that the NATO Status of Forces Agreement, or SOFA, between the United States and Italy stripped the United States of jurisdiction over his offenses. In Dorrbecker’s view, the SOFA gave Italy the primary right to prosecute him. And because Italy did not waive its primary right, Dorrbecker argues, the United States military courts lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over his offenses.

The NATO SOFA does not suggest that the existence of the United States’ jurisdiction turned on Italy’s waiver of its “primary right to exercise jurisdiction.” And even assuming the United States violated the SOFA’s waiver provision, such a violation is not grounds for a federal court to set aside Dorrbecker’s court-martial convictions.

Affirmed.

Dorrbecker v. Howard, Case No. 22-7371, April 17, 2026. 4th Cir. (Rushing), from DSC at Beaufort (Anderson Jr.). Robert Allan Feldmeier for Appellant. Martin L. Holmes Jr. for Appellee. VLW 026-2-139. 23 pp.

Full-Text Opinion

VLW 026-2-139
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