Civil rights – Officer denied immunity in fatal shooting case

Where an officer fatally shot a man who did not pose an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others and who was not actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight, and it was clearly established that an officer shooting an individual under these circumstances violates the Fourth Amendment, the officer’s qualified immunity motion was denied.

Background

Charles Byers was shot and killed during an encounter with Gordon Painter, a Chesterfield County police officer. Byers’ parents filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Painter, alleging excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Painter appeals from the district court’s denial of his motion to dismiss the complaint on qualified immunity grounds.

Standard

A court evaluates whether an officer has used excessive force based on a standard of “objective reasonableness.” Consistent with this court’s precedent at the time, the district court focused its reasonableness analysis “on the moment that deadly force was used, not the whole episode.”

While this appeal was pending, the Supreme Court issued Barnes v. Felix, 605 U.S. 73 (2025), holding that “a court cannot . . . ‘narrow’ the totality-of-the-circumstances inquiry, to focus on only a single moment. The district court accordingly applied an improper standard in its Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis.

In evaluating the totality of the circumstances to determine whether Painter’s use of force was objectively reasonable, the court considers (1) the “severity of the crime at issue,” (2) “whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others” and (3) “whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.”

 Severity

The first factor  weighs in favor of Painter. The officers were aware that Byers had attempted to enter two residences and was observed holding a hatchet on the private property of a third party. Based on these facts, a reasonable officer confronted with this information would have understood that the severity of the reported crime was high.

Threat

Although it is undisputed that Byers possessed a hatchet and ignored the officers’ numerous commands to drop the weapon, there is no allegation in the complaint or video that Byers’ conduct signaled to the officers that he intended to use the hatchet in a way that “imminently threaten[ed] the safety of the officer or another person.”

As shown in the video, Byers kept the hatchet lowered at his waist throughout the encounter and never made any movement suggesting that he intended to use the hatchet or to throw it at the officers. Although Byers stated twice that the officers should “come get [the hatchet],” those statements, spoken from a distance of about 25 feet without any accompanying movement or furtive gesture toward the officers, were insufficient to constitute an immediate threat to the officers’ safety. Moreover, as alleged and as shown in the video, instead of advancing toward the officers, Byers attempted to distance himself from the officers throughout the encounter.

After Painter fired the initial three shots, Byers turned and began to run away from the officers. So, at that point, when Painter shot Byers an additional three or four times, Byers was no longer facing the officers and was not in a position to throw the hatchet at the officers, to charge at them or otherwise to physically threaten them.

Resisting

Although Byers continued to walk away from the officers, the officers never ordered Byers to stop. Moreover, Byers backed slowly away from officers throughout the encounter and did not try to run until after Painter shot him three times. This encounter is not the kind of dangerous chase or active resistance that this court has previously held justified the use of deadly force. And Byers’ failure to heed commands to drop the hatchet did not render his conduct “resistance” in this context. So the plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that Painter’s use of force was not “objectively reasonable” and violated the Fourth Amendment.

Clearly established

To support a denial of qualified immunity, the contours of the constitutional right must be “sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would [have understood] that what he is doing violates that right.” The court conclude that Hensley v. Price, 876 F.3d 573 (4th Cir. 2017) clearly established that an officer shooting an individual under these circumstances violates the Fourth Amendment.

Affirmed.

Dissenting opinion

Diaz, C.J., dissenting:

No case gave Painter notice that his actions violated clearly established law. So he’s entitled to qualified immunity.

Geneva Enterprises, LLC v. Chavez, Case No. 25-1469, April 10, 2026. 4th Cir. (King), from EDVA at Alexandria (Hilton). Robert Wesley Thayer Tucci for Appellants. Leslie Paul Machado for Appellees. VLW 026-2-138. 14 pp.

Full-Text Opinion

VLW 026-2-138
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