Criminal – Evidence didn’t support voluntary manslaughter jury instruction

Where a man convicted of second-degree murder argued the trial court improperly refused to give a voluntary manslaughter instruction, this argument was rejected. A court need not instruct a jury on voluntary manslaughter if the evidence shows that the defendant was provoked by nothing more than “mere words,” as here.

Background

A jury convicted James Ray Williams of second-degree murder and use of a firearm in the commission of a felony.

Jury instruction

Williams asserts that the trial court improperly refused his voluntary manslaughter instruction. This court disagrees. A court need not instruct a jury on voluntary manslaughter if the evidence shows that the defendant was provoked by nothing more than “mere words.”

Here, even in best light to Williams, the evidence shows only that Maurice Massey insinuated that Sean Bowman stole Williams’ drugs. So even if Bowman’s alleged burglary would have constituted reasonable provocation, Massey’s “mere words” describing said burglary would be “insufficient as a matter of law to prove ‘heat of passion.’”

Moreover, although Williams was angry with Bowman, there was not more than a scintilla of evidence that rage or fear drove Williams to kill Bowman on impulse without conscious reflection. Rather, the evidence proved that, upon concluding that Bowman stole from him, Williams made a conscious and calculated decision to confront him at the North Thomas apartment.

Massey’s and Nicole Bailey’s accounts of the shooting itself describe a man seeking to control the scene, not one blinded to conscious reflection by rage. Because there was no evidence of reasonable provocation, and not more than a scintilla of evidence to support the theory that Williams killed Bowman in the heat of passion, the trial court properly refused Williams’ voluntary manslaughter instruction.

Investigation report

Under Code § 19.2-188, “[r]eports of investigations made by the Chief Medical Examiner, his assistants or medical examiners, and the records and certified reports of autopsies made under the authority of Title 32.1” are admissible “as evidence in any court . . . proceeding.” Williams asserts that this provision does not apply to the Death Scene Investigation Report because its author (Anderson), did not work in the office of the Chief Medical Examiner. Thus, Williams contends, the trial court should have excluded the report as inadmissible hearsay because Anderson did not testify at trial.

Assuming, without deciding, that the trial court erred in admitting the Death Scene Investigation Report, any such error was harmless. Most of the information in that report was also presented through the live testimony of the medical examiner, police officers and crime scene technicians at the scene. Thus, Williams had the ability to cross-examine those witnesses regarding those facts.

Moreover the Commonwealth’s murder case turned on whether the jury believed the eyewitness testimony. Williams has not identified any information in the report that was probative of his identity as the killer. Massey and Bailey confirmed that Williams fatally shot Bowman, and despite his attempts to impeach their testimony, the jury credited it. Given the overwhelming eyewitness testimony and corroborating evidence, any error in admitting the report was harmless.

Text messages

Williams challenges the trial court’s admission of several text messages under Virginia Rule of Evidence 2:404(b). This court disagrees with Williams that the challenged texts were irrelevant to his motive.

The Commonwealth argued to the jury that Williams killed Bowman because he believed Bowman stole drugs from him. Massey’s testimony was the principal evidence supporting this motive. But the Commonwealth was entitled to corroborate Massey’s testimony in this regard, particularly given defense counsel’s vigorous attempts to impeach him.

Williams does not contest that the challenged texts support the conclusion that he was engaged in drug trafficking at the time of the killing. To be sure, Williams’ drug trafficking activity does not conclusively establish that Williams believed that Bowman stole drugs from him. But his drug trafficking activity makes that supposition more probable than without the evidence.

Accordingly, the texts were relevant to Williams’ motive and were admissible under Rule 2:404(b). The trial court also did not abuse its discretion by determining that the legitimate probative value of the texts outweighed their incidental prejudice.

Affirmed.

Williams v. Commonwealth, Record No. 1841-24-4, April 28, 2026. CAV (unpublished opinion) (Friedman). From the Circuit Court of Arlington County (Wheat). Brett P. Blobaum, Senior Appellate Attorney (Virginia Indigent Defense Commission, on briefs), for appellant. Mason D. Williams, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S. Miyares, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee. VLW 026-7-171. 14 pp.

Full-Text Opinion

VLW 026-7-171
Virginia Lawyers Weekly