Criminal – Man convicted of possessing unregistered firearm silences

Where a man convicted of possessing three unregistered device silencers challenged his conviction on multiple grounds, each of his challenges was denied and his conviction was affirmed.

Background

The National Firearms Act, or NFA, criminalizes the possession of unregistered firearms. And the NFA defines firearms to include silencers. The government prosecuted Hatchet M. Speed for possessing three unregistered devices that it felt met the NFA’s definition of a silencer.

Speed, however, insisted that the devices were not silencers and, as a result, did not have to be registered. He argued that they were “solvent traps,” which are typically used to clean firearms, and that they didn’t function as silencers without modifications. Following a two-day trial, a federal jury found Speed guilty of three counts of unlawful possession of an unregistered silencer.

Jury instructions

Speed argues that the district court‘s jury instructions incorrectly charged that a silencer need not be operable to support a conviction. This court concludes that the jury instructions were accurate.

Nothing in the definition suggests the fact that the possessor might have to take the additional step of drilling a hole takes a device or parts outside the NFA’s definition. Had Congress intended to cover only devices currently operating as silencers, it could easily have included such language. But it did not. And this conclusion accords with how other circuits have, so far as we this court is aware, universally approached the issue.

Second, the statutory silencer definition specifically includes “any combination of parts, designed or redesigned, and intended for use in assembling or fabricating a firearm silencer or firearm muffler.” To the extent there is any question about whether the device or parts had to be currently operable as a silencer, this language clarifies that they don’t.

Sufficiency

Speed also argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction. This court disagrees. The government produced evidence showing that, regardless of how they were labeled, the features of the HIT devices did not permit them to operate effectively as solvent traps but permitted the devices to operate very well as silencers. Paraphrasing the popular saying, if something walks like a silencer, swims like a silencer and quacks like a silencer, a reasonable jury could have found the device was a silencer.

The jury also heard evidence reflecting Speed’s knowledge that the HIT devices were capable of being used as silencers. In addition, Speed discussed how he intended to use his HIT devices.

Vagueness

Speed appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment based on his theory that, under the government’s interpretation of the definition of a silencer, the NFA is unconstitutionally vague. Speed insists that, under the government’s interpretation, a number of everyday household objects could be used to suppress the sound of firing a gun.

It could be true that a plastic bottle, potato or other objects Speed mentions can suppress the report of a firearm. But regardless of what else the NFA could cover, the HIT devices Speed possessed are “clearly proscribed” by the text of the statute. And when “a law clearly prohibits a defendant’s conduct, the defendant cannot challenge, and a court cannot examine, whether the law may be vague for other hypothetical defendants.”

Second Amendment

Speed argues that his conviction is unconstitutional because the Second Amendment protects possession of silencers. This court need not decide whether silencers are arms protected under the text of the Second Amendment. Even assuming they are, Speed’s challenge fails for a separate reason—regulating arms through shall-issue licensing regimes is presumptively constitutional in the Fourth Circuit.

Affirmed.

Concurring opinion

Wilkinson, J., concurring:

I write separately to share my view that Speed’s challenge fails for an additional reason. The people’s elected representatives may regulate silencers as they see fit because silencers are categorically unprotected by the Second Amendment.

Concurring opinion

Richardson, J., concurring:

Our Court requires challengers to show that a shall-issue regime that burdens the right to keep and bear arms is “particularly abusive” to establish a prima facie case for Second Amendment protection. Although this half-step between steps one and two is the binding precedent of this circuit, it disregards both the Second Amendment’s plain text and Supreme Court precedent. Though we have no choice but to follow this circuit’s aberrant framework, I remain hopeful that we will one day assess firearm regulations against history and tradition.

United States v. Speed, Case No. 23-4308, May 5, 2026. 4th Cir. (Quattlebaum), from EDVA at Alexandria (Nachmanoff). Roger Isaac Roots for Appellant. Brian James Samuels for Appellee. VLW 026-2-167. 36 pp.

Full-Text Opinion
VLW 026-2-167

• United States v. Speed