Defendant not prejudiced by counsel’s performance

Where the Virginia Supreme Court concluded that the performance of the attorney for a defendant charged with involuntary manslaughter fell below the standard of care, but that the failure did not prejudice the defendant, and the defendant failed to demonstrate this conclusion was “so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement,” his habeas petition was denied.

Background

A Virginia jury convicted Cameron Crockett of involuntary manslaughter after his car crashed into a tree killing the front seat passenger. To reach this result, the jury concluded that Crockett was driving under the influence at the time of the crash.

Crockett subsequently sought post-conviction relief in Virginia state court, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. Crockett, who insisted he was not wearing a seatbelt at the time of the accident, asserted that his lawyer failed to investigate evidence of the operation and use of the driver’s seatbelt. He claimed that a proper investigation would have revealed the driver’s seatbelt was used at the time of the accident, meaning he could not have been the driver. The Supreme Court of Virginia held that, although the counsel’s performance fell below the standard of care, that failure did not prejudice Crockett.

In response, Crockett brought a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 making essentially the same arguments. The district court denied the § 2254 petition.

Standard

In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the Supreme Court set forth a two-part test to evaluate ineffective assistance of counsel claims. First, the petitioner must show counsel’s performance was deficient and fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.

Second, the petitioner must show prejudice, meaning “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Counsel gets the strong presumption that he or she rendered “adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.”

Merits

The Supreme Court of Virginia found that Crockett met his burden of showing deficient representation by his trial counsel. But it held that Crockett “failed to establish prejudice under Strickland.”

In explaining that decision, the court focused on the primary evidence on which Crockett’s petition was based: a report of retained expert David Pape, Ph.D., P.E., which concluded that one section of the driver’s seatbelt webbing had “cupping” consistent with occupant forces during a collision. The Supreme Court of Virginia noted that the report merely “‘suggest[ed]’ the driver’s seatbelt was in use at the time of the crash.” Because of that, the court held that “it cannot be said there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different had this evidence been obtained and admitted before the jury.”

Crockett disagrees with the court’s analysis. And arguably, reasonable jurists could have agreed with Crockett. But that, of course, is not this court’s standard. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, or AEDPA, requires an “extreme malfunction[] in the state criminal justice system[],” such as a decision “so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Here, to the contrary, the Supreme Court of Virginia based its decision, in part, on the less than conclusive language Pape used in his report.

But the court did not stop there. It also evaluated the persuasiveness of Crockett’s theory that Palmer was driving the car. While Crockett disagrees with this analysis as well, the court based its decision on a full assessment of evidence presented at Crockett’s trial. One could certainly come to a different conclusion. But the conclusion reached by the Supreme Court was not unreasonable.

Undeterred, Crockett advances another argument. He insists that the Supreme Court of Virginia did not consider the totality of the evidence — specifically, additional evidence that would have driven home “the significance of the belted driver.” Contrary to Crockett’s assertions, the Supreme Court of Virginia considered all the evidence. What’s more, under AEDPA, a state court need not refer to each piece of a petitioner’s evidence.

Crockett also maintains that the Supreme Court of Virginia’s Strickland prejudice analysis, in particular the court’s discussion of the report, rested on an “unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence” under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). Even though Crockett frames his argument differently, this is essentially the same argument he made under § 2254(d)(1). For basically the same reasons discussed above, Crockett failed to meet his burden under § 2254(d)(2).

Affirmed.

Crockett v. Clarke, Case No. 19-6636, May 24, 2022. 4th Cir. (Quattlebaum), from EDVA at Richmond (Lauck). Lauren Elizabeth Bateman for Appellant. Victoria Lee Johnson for Appellee. VLW 022-2-129. 12 pp.