Criminal: Evidence supported straw man firearm solicitation conviction

Although the defendant argued that he could not have solicited the purchaser, because she did not receive any benefit from him in return for purchasing the firearms, the court rejected this argument. Nothing in the plain language of Code § 18.2-308.2:2(N) requires a “quid pro quo” for a finding of solicitation.

Background

Trier Ladante Smith was convicted in a bench trial of two counts of solicitation to purchase a firearm by a person ineligible to possess a firearm, in violation of Code § 18.2-308.2:2(N), and two counts of possession of a firearm by a violent felon, in violation of Code § 18.2-308.2. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred by convicting him because the evidence was insufficient to prove he solicited, employed or assisted another person in purchasing the firearms.

Analysis

The plain language of Code § 18.2-308.2:2(N) instructs that a violation of that statute occurs when a convicted felon “solicits, employs, or assists” another in knowingly and intentionally making a straw purchase of a firearm for him.  Appellant contends that the evidence “established only that [he] made suggestions towards purchases of firearms.” Appellant asserts there was no evidence that he “took any active role in directing or assisting in the purchases,” that Tyesha Robles “claim[ed] she had received any benefit from [him] in exchange for purchasing the firearms” or that Robles intended to provide the firearms to appellant.

To “solicit[] . . . any person in violating subsection M” of the statute requires that a defendant ineligible to purchase, receive, or possess a firearm request, petition or otherwise move someone to action to purchase him a firearm, where the buyer has certain knowledge and intent as per Code § 18.2-308.2:2(M). This understanding of what it means to “solicit[]” someone under Code § 18.2-308.2:2(N) comports with long-standing Virginia caselaw defining solicitation.

Here, Robles testified that appellant accompanied her to browse pawnshop firearms and that he told her “which guns to pick out and purchase.” For the Aug. 28, 2022, purchase, appellant also showed Robles a specific firearm on a website, indicated “it’s this one” and then waited outside the pawnshop while Robles bought the firearm. For the Nov. 3, 2022, purchase, Robles agreed that she purchased the AR-style firearm “at [appellant’s] direction because he was unable to.”

By his conduct on each occasion, appellant requested that Robles purchase a firearm and moved her to do so. And Robles’ testimony established that the firearms were purchased, at least in part, for appellant as part of their “household” and “because he wasn’t allowed to” buy firearms himself, as well as that Robles knew appellant was a convicted felon who “couldn’t have a gun.” Accordingly, a rational trier of fact could have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that appellant solicited Robles in making straw purchases of firearms for him.

Appellant, however, argues that he could not have solicited Robles because she did not receive any benefit from him in return for purchasing the firearms. This court rejects this argument. Nothing in the plain language of Code § 18.2-308.2:2(N) requires a “quid pro quo” for a finding of solicitation, and the legislature clearly knows how to include language specifically requiring that a benefit be conferred if it wishes to do so.

Affirmed.

Smith v. Commonwealth, Record No. 1999-24-1, July 29, 2025. CAV (Malveaux). From the Circuit Court of the City of Virginia Beach (Iaquinto). Roger A. Whitus (Slipow & Robusto P.C., on brief), for appellant. Rebecca Johnson Hickey, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S. Miyares, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee. VLW 025-7-197. 10 pp.