Employment – Consultant’s sex discrimination claim is dismissed

Where a woman grounded her sex discrimination claim on allegations that she was constructively discharged, she was not transferred from her supervisor’s team and her work hours were cut, but she did not plead facts making her constructive discharge claim plausible, a failure to transfer is not an adverse employment action under Title VII and she pleaded no facts plausibly showing the reduction in work hours was “because of” her sex, this claim was dismissed.

Background

Stephanie Boudreaux filed a four-count amended complaint against Booz Allen Hamilton Inc., or BAH: (1) gender discrimination under Title VII, retaliation under the Americans with Disabilities Act, or ADA, Title VII retaliation and retaliation under the Virginia Human Rights Act, or VHRA. BAH has filed a motion to dismiss.

Timeliness

Title VII and the ADA require plaintiffs in Virginia to file an EEOC charge within 300 days of an alleged unlawful employment action. Title VII “precludes recovery for discrete acts of discrimination or retaliation that occur outside the statutory time period.”

Boudreaux filed her EEOC charge on or about Sept. 13, 2023. Thus, BAH asserts that Boudreaux’s allegations preceding Nov. 17, 2022, are time barred. Boudreaux’s sole rebuttal is that the “continuing violation” theory saves pre-Nov. 17, 2022, allegations. The court disagrees.

“[I]t is well-settled that the continuing violation theory only applies to hostile work environment claims.” Boudreaux explicitly denies that she is asserting a hostile workplace claim. Instead, her amended complaint alleges discrete acts of discrimination, not a continuing violation.

Thus, Boudreaux’s allegations relating to events occurring before Nov. 17, 2022, are time-barred for purposes of Boudreaux’s federal claims. Because the alleged protected activity that forms the basis of Boudreaux’s ADA retaliation claim occurs before
Nov. 17, 2022, this claim is dismissed.

Exhaustion

BAH argues that Boudreaux’s Title VII retaliation claim has not been exhausted, as her EEOC charge did not list such a claim. Boudreaux responds that her
Title VII retaliation claim is “like or reasonably related to” her charge. The court agrees with Boudreaux.

Her charge recounts Graham’s allegedly discriminatory conduct, notes that
Boudreaux reported it to human resources, and alleges some adverse action followed. Moreover, BAH’s own position statement to the EEOC describes conduct Boudreaux self-reported as “retaliatory and discriminatory based on sex” to the employee relations team. Considering Boudreaux’s EEOC charge with “utmost liberality,” as the court must, the court finds that Boudreaux has exhausted her Title VII retaliation claim.

BAH next argues that any allegations from January to March 2023 in
Boudreaux’s amended complaint are procedurally barred, as Boudreaux omitted those events from her EEOC charge. Boudreaux responds that these allegations are not procedurally barred, as they are “like or reasonably related to” the conduct that she did describe in her charge. Again, the court agrees with Boudreaux.

Title VII discrimination

To state a claim for sex discrimination under Title VII, Boudreaux “must allege sufficient facts to make it plausible that (1) she suffered an adverse employment action, and (2) the action was because of her sex.”
Boudreaux alleges that BAH took three adverse actions because of her sex: that BAH cut her work hours, kept her on
Mr. Graham’s team and constructively discharged her.

The court finds that Boudreaux’s alleged constructive discharge does not constitute an “adverse action” for the purposes of
Boudreaux’s Title VII claim. The “difficult or unpleasant working conditions” described by Boudreaux, although unfortunate, would not “compel a reasonable person to resign.”

Boudreaux’s second alleged adverse action — that BAH kept her on Graham’s team rather than reassigning her because of her sex — fares no better. Courts have repeatedly held that “denial of a request to transfer to a new supervisor is not an adverse action.” Finally, even if reduction of her work hours constituted an adverse employment action, Boudreaux has not plausibly alleged that this occurred “because of” her sex.

Retaliation

Boudreaux only vaguely alleges “Defendant” (that is, BAH the corporate entity) retaliated against her. She “does not actually articulate who was the ‘decisionmaker’ responsible for [the adverse actions] and does not allege that the responsible individual even knew of” her allegedly protected activity. This is insufficient to establish a causal link between her protected activity and any alleged adverse action.

Defendant’s motion to dismiss granted.

Boudreaux v. Booz Allen Hamilton, Inc., Case No. 3:25-cv-00051, March 19, 2026. WDVA at Charlottesville (Yoon). VLW 026-3-129. 19 pp.

Full-Text Opinion

VLW 026-3-129
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