Criminal: Man convicted for hitting another man with his vehicle

After the defendant struck and killed a man with his vehicle, he argued two charges were inconsistent with each other, because the second-degree murder offense required the commonwealth to prove malice and intentionality, while the hit and run statute addressed conduct following an accident. This argument failed. Virginia case law is clear that, in the context of felony hit and run, “it makes no difference whether the collision was intentional or unintentional.”

Background                                                                         

The facts of the case are not in dispute. In 2020, Quincy Eugene Moore and Donald Jeffreys had a verbal and physical altercation at a neighborhood gathering. Party attendees separated them, and Jeffreys walked away still making verbal threats. Although Jeffreys was approximately 500 feet away from the party, Moore, “still angry, jumped” into his girlfriend’s car and sped down the street toward Jeffreys, who was walking “in or near the center of the street.”

Moore struck Jeffreys at “36 miles per hour” and fled after making two U-turns to return to the site of impact. Moore did not report the event to the police and remained at large for two days. Jeffreys died at the scene from blunt force injuries to his head and neck.

Moore moved to dismiss or for the Commonwealth to elect which of the charges it would proceed on, arguing that the proof of an element required for one offense “necessarily require[d] proof of an opposite element in the other offense.” Specifically, he argued that for the Commonwealth to prevail on a second-degree murder offense, it must prove malice and intentionality. But, he argued, the hit and run statute requires a driver involved in an accident in which a person is killed to stop and render aid and report the event to law enforcement.

The trial court denied Moore’s motion and granted the Commonwealth’s motion to amend the hit and run jury instruction from “accidental” to “unintentional,” finding that it was a “proper solution . . . when . . . talking about an accidental defense to murder.” Under the terms of a written plea agreement, Moore entered a conditional Alford guilty plea for voluntary manslaughter and leaving the scene of an accident involving death or serious bodily injury. Moore reserved his right to appeal the trial court’s pre-trial denial of his motion to dismiss or elect.

Analysis

“Every unlawful homicide is presumed to be murder in the second degree.” “Second-degree murder does not require a specific intent to kill.” “If he acts with malice, the accused need only intend ‘to perform the conduct’ causing the victim’s death.”

“Malice is evidenced either when the accused acted with a sedate, deliberate mind, and formed design, or committed any purposeful and cruel act without any or without great provocation.” Malice may be implied from use of a deadly weapon, including a motor vehicle.

Here, the Commonwealth’s evidence established that after a verbal and physical altercation at a neighborhood gathering, Jeffreys left on foot. Still angry, Moore drove his girlfriend’s car into Jeffreys at 36 miles per hour, killing him. Thus, the Commonwealth had probable cause to believe that Moore committed second-degree murder and could level that charge in good faith.

Virginia case law is also clear that, in the context of felony hit and run, “it makes no difference whether the collision was intentional or unintentional.” Here, after striking Jeffreys with the car, Moore fled the scene and failed to report the incident to the police. Thus, the Commonwealth had probable cause to believe that Moore was guilty of hit and run.

Moore acknowledges the adverse authority, but argues that his case is distinguishable because, in his view, the indictments “negate one another given that the proof of an element of one offense necessarily requires proof of an opposite element in the other offense.” The court disagrees.

The law could not be more clear: criminal liability attaches irrespective of whether “the collision was intentional or unintentional.” The precedent defeats the premise of Moore’s argument. Accordingly, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed, but remanded for correction of a typographical error

Affirmed and remanded.

Moore v. Commonwealth, Record No. 0468-24-2, Dec. 2, 2025. CAV (unpublished opinion) (per curiam). From the Circuit Court of Halifax County (White). (Mark B. Arthur; Mark B. Arthur, PC, on brief), for appellant. (Jason S. Miyares, Attorney General; Timothy J. Huffstutter, Assistant Attorney General, on brief), for appellee. VLW 025-7-342. 6 pp.