Municipal – Takings claim against City of Baltimore is dismissed

Where six individuals who own property adjacent to a land development project that has not materially progressed in the past two decades since the City of Baltimore procured much of the land by using eminent domain brought a Takings claim, it failed as a matter of law. Holding a protected property interest in taken property is an essential element of any takings claim and, here, the plaintiffs did not contend that any of their properties have been taken, either physically or by regulation.

Background

Roughly two decades ago, the City of Baltimore entered into the Land Disposition and Development Agreement, or LDDA, with a property developer to redevelop 13.8 acres of land in the city’s Poppleton neighborhood. Pursuant to this agreement, the city acquired the land at issue – much of it by using eminent domain. But in the intervening years, the redevelopment project suffered myriad complications and delays, and very little of the promised development ever occurred. Large portions of this land now sit vacant and neglected.

Six individuals who own property adjacent to the land at issue and a non-profit community organization sued the developer and various Baltimore City defendants, challenging both the development agreement and subsequent actions (and inactions) of the defendants. The district court dismissed the complaint.

Takings

The district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ takings claim for lack of Article III standing. To establish Article III standing, a plaintiff must show “(i) that he suffered an injury in fact that is concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; (ii) that the injury was likely caused by the defendant; and (iii) that the injury would likely be redressed by judicial relief.”

Here, the individual plaintiffs each allege that property they own has diminished in value as a result of the LDDA and the related use of eminent domain. These allegations are sufficient to establish that the plaintiffs have a “personal stake” in – and thus Article III standing to bring – their takings claim.

That does not mean they can succeed on the merits of that claim. The individual plaintiffs “all maintain ownership over their properties and . . . do not contend that any of their properties have been taken,” either physically or by regulation. This fact prevents them from succeeding on the merits. The Takings Clause does not provide the plaintiffs with a mechanism to challenge the taking of their former neighbors’ properties because holding a protected property interest in taken property is an essential element of any takings claim.

These plaintiffs have not claimed any property interest in anything taken by the government. Nor have they identified any cases holding that someone other than the owner of the taken property may bring a takings claim. Caselaw from this court and other circuits makes clear why: A protected property interest in the taken property is an essential element of a takings claim. The plaintiffs’ failure to satisfy this element means their takings claim fails as a matter of law.

For these reasons, this court agrees with the district court that the plaintiffs’ takings claim must be dismissed. To align this dismissal with this court’s reasoning, however, it vacates the portion of the judgment dismissing the plaintiffs’ takings claim for lack of standing and remands to the district court with instructions to dismiss this claim for failure to state a claim.

Nuisance

The district court considered the private nuisance claim after it had dismissed each of the plaintiffs’ federal law claims. As a general rule, however, “when a district court dismisses all federal claims in the early stages of litigation . . . it should decline to exercise jurisdiction over any remaining pendent state law claims by dismissing those claims without prejudice.”

Here, all the plaintiffs’ federal claims were dismissed when this litigation was still in its “early stages” – at the motion-to-dismiss stage – and no discovery had yet occurred. Moreover, the issues in this case implicate particularly strong state interests, and there is no substantial caselaw applying Maryland private nuisance law to claims analogous to this one.

This court therefore vacates the dismissal of the plaintiffs’ private nuisance claim for failure to state a claim, and remands to the district court with instructions to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over this claim and dismiss it without prejudice.

Declaratory Judgment

The plaintiffs finally contend that the district court erred by not specifically addressing their separately pled claim for a declaratory judgment. This was not error. The Declaratory Judgment Act “does not create an independent cause of action.” It “is remedial only” and does not “create[] any substantive rights.” Thus, when all the plaintiffs’ substantive claims were dismissed, their declaratory judgment claim also necessarily failed.

Vacated in part and remanded with instructions.

Poppleton Now Community Association, Inc. v. LA Cite Development, LLC, Case No. 25-1770, May 4, 2026. 4th Cir. (Harris), from DMD at Baltimore (Abelson). Thomas K. Prevas for Appellants. Anthony J. Phillips for Appellees. VLW 026-2-163. 16 pp.

Full-Text Opinion
VLW 026-2-163