Criminal: Defendant argues he shouldn’t have been allowed to represent himself

Where a defendant who represented himself at his supervised release revocation hearing now argued the trial court erred by allowing him to proceed pro se, but the totality of the circumstances confirms that he made a knowing and voluntary choice, this argument was rejected.

Background

The President of the United States commuted Eric Walton’s life sentence. But within a year of leaving prison, Walton was caught possessing drugs and transporting drug proceeds in violation of the terms of his supervised release. At Walton’s request, the district court permitted him to represent himself in the supervised release revocation proceedings. After a hearing, the court revoked his release and imposed a sentence of 60 months’ imprisonment.

Walton appeals, faulting the district court for letting him represent himself, arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction over his “presidentially commuted sentence” and claiming the court imposed a plainly unreasonable revocation sentence.

Jurisdiction

Walton contends that, after the commutation, he was serving a “Presidentially commuted sentence, not a judicially imposed sentence,” therefore the district court—and the entire judicial branch—lacked jurisdiction to revoke his supervised release. That is incorrect. The commutation order left “intact and in effect [Walton’s] 13-year term of supervised release with all its conditions and all other components of the sentence.” Walton does not, and cannot, rebut that unambiguous directive.

Instead, Walton attempts to draw support from a concurring opinion in United States v. Surratt, 855 F.3d 218, 219-220 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc), which opined that this court lacked jurisdiction to alter a defendant’s sentence of imprisonment after a presidential commutation. Here, however, the commutation order specifically left “intact and in effect the 13-year term of supervised release with all its conditions.” The order did not alter the judicially imposed term of supervised release in any respect. And Walton does not collaterally attack the supervised release term the president left in place.

Pro se

Walton contends that the district court erred by allowing him to proceed pro se. In particular, Walton asserts that the court did not conduct “an adequate inquiry” to determine whether his request to represent himself was “clear and unequivocal” and “made knowingly and intelligently.”

At the outset, the parties dispute the standard of review. This court agrees with the government that “the waiver of right to counsel in a supervised release revocation for abuse of discretion.” When a district court denies an offender’s request to proceed pro se during such proceedings, this court has reviewed for abuse of discretion. For the same reasons, an abuse of discretion standard should apply when a court grants an offender’s request to proceed pro se. Other circuits agree.

Here, the totality of the circumstances confirms that Walton made a knowing and voluntary choice to represent himself. Walton made his decision “knowing not only that the district court was prepared to provide counsel to him but that an experienced defense attorney was, in fact, standing by in the courtroom to serve as a resource for him.”

Walton’s pro se motion and his presentation at the final revocation hearing demonstrate he “understood [what] was at stake” and had “a sufficient grasp of . . . [the] consequence of the waiver.” Walton voiced his desire to represent himself at least three times—in a motion, to appointed counsel and directly to the court.

Revocation sentence

Walton argues that his 60-month revocation sentence is procedurally unreasonable—and plainly so—because the district court (1) did not ensure that Walton understood the alleged violations, (2) did not correctly grade the violations and (3) did not adequately explain the sentence. The court disagrees with each argument.

Affirmed.

Concurring/dissenting opinion

Gregory, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part:

I concur with and join the majority’s holding that we have jurisdiction to hear this appeal. However Eric Walton did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to an attorney at his supervised release revocation hearing and thus the district court erroneously allowed him to proceed pro se. For that error alone, I would reverse the district court and remand for re-sentencing.

But that is not all: His supervised release revocation hearing was riddled with procedural errors, all of which the majority ignores. Because the majority fails to appreciate the magnitude of these errors, I must respectfully dissent.

United States v. Walton, Case No. 23-4314, July 28, 2025. 4th Cir. (Rushing), from NDWVA at Wheeling (Bailey). Brendan S. Leary for Appellant. Jennifer Therese Conklin for Appellee. VLW 025-2-287. 44 pp.